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Multiculturalism and feminism
Incompatibility, compatibility, or synonymity?
OONAGH REITMAN
London School of Economics
INTRODUCTION
A critical set of questions currently being asked in debates about public
administration in culturally diverse society concerns the relationship
between feminism and multiculturalism. I shall not take space here to
elaborate the definition of the two forms of politics whose intersection is at
issue in the debate, for this will be provided as the argument unfolds, the
issue of definition remaining very much in contention throughout. For now,
consider the questions which drive this debate: can contemporary western
society engage in policies of toleration and accommodation in respect of
diversity within society, while at the same time pursuing its commitment to
reducing differentials of power between men and women? ‘Is multi-
culturalism bad for women’ (Okin, 1999a)? Or ‘is feminism bad for
multiculturalism’ (Kukathas, 2001)? Or can, as some claim, the two sets of
policies be pursued together (e.g. Kymlicka, 1999a and 1999b and Shachar
2001)?
The focus of this commentary is on establishing which principles of
justice ought to govern state policy in respect of minority patriarchy – are
these principles to be regarded as being dicated by feminism or multi-
culturalism or a combination of both? As a working definition, the term
‘minority patriarchy’ denotes the collective category of individual or
tangible practices producing patriarchal forms of regulation which arise
out of a minority’s distinct set of norms or codes, submission to which is
considered defining in some significant way of group membership or as a
marker of identity. To facilitate discussion, I use one particular context, that
of minority regulation of divorce, and ask how state policy ought to be
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formulated in respect to it. How should contemporary western multi-
cultural states respond, for instance, to recent calls for greater accommo-
dation of rules governing divorce dictated in sharia (Islamic law) or halacha
(Jewish law) in light of the potential penalties women may suffer in abusive
deployment of these rules? In general discussion, the definition aims to
centre the argument at the most concrete level of analysis, focusing on
tangible practices of patriarchy, eschewing until the end the more systemic
or intangible aspects of patriarchy, which are addressed separately.
This is only a working definition, made for pragmatic reasons defended
in the ensuing argument (and it is somewhat controversial). It is meant
to avoid engaging with cultures as a whole, under a totalizing effect which
risks ascribing them as entirely patriarchal, when in fact the reality is
much more complicated and nuanced. As I hope will become apparent,
this definition enables one to more accurately pinpoint where attention
should rest in trying to configure multiculturalism and feminism and,
through this, to establish how the state is to structure its responses to the
social problems addressed in the debates considered here. With its focus
on policy in respect of minority patriarchy, this commentary ends up being
largely critical of the literature it considers, arguing that, for differing
reasons, the approaches adopted in this literature, when applied to the
problem of minority patriarchy (as defined), would be unlikely optimally
to resolve it.
My critique is not to be read in absolute terms, as an outright negation
of these approaches but, rather, as an observation of enduring risk posed
to women when the different ethical considerations arising in this context
are not sufficiently carefully organized, as I contend would be the case were
the policy-making process to adopt approaches rejected in what follows. My
aim is to suggest a way of sorting through these often apparently conflict-
ing considerations, which more clearly identifies where emphasis should be
placed so as to avoid unjust regulatory outcomes, especially as far as women
are concerned. My focus here is on answering questions of orientation,
asking how to approach the problem of patriarchy arising in the minority
context and, through this, how to configure multiculturalism and feminism,
and less with the nuts and bolts of how this approach is to be translated into
practice.
The multiculturalism/feminism debate started in earnest with the defence
of multiculturalism and asked whether policies thereby endorsed were
compatible with feminism. The social problems associated with patriarchy
only entered, at least initially, as second-order considerations, primarily as
potential obstacles to the defence of multiculturalism. If, however, one starts
by considering problems associated with patriarchy arising in the minority
context, one begins to see a different dialogical trajectory in the literature –
one debating the salience of cultural (and other) difference in the formu-
lation of feminist policy, pitting not multiculturalists against feminists, but
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feminists against each other. I shall refer to this other debate as the
‘feminist difference debate.’
My argument here, on one level, is very simple: it consists of arguing for
more overlap between these two debates, and specifically that the multi-
culturalism/feminism debate would be well served by taking on board some
of the arguments aired in the feminist difference debate. My contention is
that the more this is done, the more compelling the argument. This suggests
need for a perspectival shift, supplementing one suggested in feminist
debates on difference for that which has the defence of multiculturalism as
its starting point.
This argument is made most directly in consideration of the work of
Susan Moller Okin, who is a central contributor to both these debates.
My argument can be viewed as continuing the repartee commenced in the
earlier feminist difference debate, developing the critique levelled there
against what one might term Okin’s universalist perspectives in the
formulation of feminist policy, and applying it both in answer to her
contributions to the multiculturalism/feminism debate and also to some
of the positions in that later debate of which she herself is critical, which
defend multiculturalism in a way she views to be at variance with
feminism.
In what follows, I cannot be comprehensive in my review of the litera-
ture debating multiculturalism and feminism – instead, the argument will
centre on a selection of contributions to the debate which advance some of
the principal ways of relating multiculturalism and feminism; the selection
being to highlight approaches thus far prominently staked, and then
engaging in more detail with those selected so as to tease out some of the
difficulties they present.
The approaches can loosely be ordered, with a first organizing sweep, into
two categories: one which holds that multiculturalism and feminism are, or
can be made to be, broadly compatible; and the other expounding the
opposite proposition, namely that a choice has to be made between them
since they are incompatible.
One choice is to prefer feminism – captured above with the suggestion
that ‘multiculturalism [is] bad for women’ (Okin, 1999a). The other choice
is to prefer multiculturalism, viewing ‘feminism [to be] bad’ in the configur-
ation (Kukathas, 2001). Each of these choices is rejected in the first part of
the commentary, adopting the same argument in respect of both, which
may seem surprising given that they are made from opposite ends of the
incompatibility-spectrum.
The second part of the commentary examines approaches which view
multiculturalism and feminism as broadly compatible, seeking to create a
balance between them. While in sympathy with these positions, my
argument concludes in explicitly feminist terms on the ground that trying
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to hold a balance between multiculturalism and feminism is too dangerous
for women in the case of policy in respect of minority patriarchy.
The third part of the commentary begins to sketch an alternative
approach in which multiculturalism and feminism are understood as
synonymous: while emphasizing that feminist principles must take priority
when policy concerns minority patriarchy, that should not lead to a
negation of multiculturalism, for it has already been reflected in many of
the positions staked in the feminist difference debate. New definitions are
accordingly needed for multiculturalism and feminism when addressing
minority patriarchy, to replace those definitions which make sense of the
relationship between them in terms of choice versus balance. The third part
also specifically discusses the more systemic aspects excluded from the
working definition of minority patriarchy used up to that point and
considers the parameters of the synonymity thesis advanced here. It is
ventured only as regards minority patriarchy as defined above. In respect
of matters excluded from that definition, the essence of the balancing
approach is found to be more compelling, at least in the first instance, and
as regards the broad questions of orientation set for this paper.
INCOMPATIBILIT Y: CHOOSING BET WEEN
MULTICULTURALISM AND FEMINISM
Choosing feminism
Although I attribute the first choice, of electing feminism to the exclusion
of multiculturalism, to Okin on the basis that the proposition that ‘multi-
culturalism [is] bad for women’ (Okin, 1999a) is derived from the title of an
influential commentary published by her, the argument supporting this
attribution is far from neat. Not only has Okin since explained that the title
was not of her own choosing (Okin, 2005: 71–2), it is, furthermore, stated
by her as a question and she later confirms that she does not ‘answer [it]
with a simple and unqualified “yes” ’ (Okin, 2005: 71). To get to this ‘yes’,
the argument which follows meanders through various broken-up stages,
and cannot be simply put. I end up upholding that the proposition does
indeed capture the essence of Okin’s approach, her more recent clarifica-
tions and caveats notwithstanding.
Okin’s argument is directed at showing how multiculturalism is actually
antithetical to feminism, suggesting that it would serve to protect and
uphold patriarchal systems of regulation and socialization, a project which
she views as running counter to that of feminism. Logically, then, one would
expect Okin to reject multiculturalism; yet she does not do so (Okin, 1998:
664 and Okin, 1999b: 131), positing instead that multiculturalism could be
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justified by sufficiently weighty factors which are to be counterbalanced
against minority patriarchy – for example, a minority group’s need for
language protection and remedies against discrimination based on group
membership (Okin, 1999a: 23). Otherwise put, multiculturalism can trump
feminism if the balance tips in its favour, even if, Okin says, ‘it would take
significant factors weighing in the other direction to counterbalance
evidence that a culture severely constrains women’s choices or otherwise
undermines their well-being’ (Okin, 1999a: 23).
This makes it look as though Okin adopts a balancing approach to the
configuration of multiculturalism and feminism, rather than a choice
approach. Yet it is different to the balancing approaches considered in the
second part of this commentary, in that the upshot, in Okin’s case, seems
ultimately to force a choice between multiculturalism and feminism when,
as we shall see, the approaches considered below want to combine the two
without need for choice. As I explain in the ensuing text, the image of
balance envisaged by Okin only really makes sense in respect of the initial
stages of policy-making, to inform the choice between multiculturalism and
feminism which is to be made in each case; whereas, in the balancing
approaches of the second part of the commentary, it is meant to be held
more generally, without need for choice.
Although I later go on to argue that the balancing approach of the
second part of the commentary runs the risk that a choice would, in
practice, be made (albeit inadvertently), here I argue that if Okin views
multiculturalism and feminism as incompatible, and I think she is only right
in doing so on the terms in which she defines them, then she ought as a
feminist to reject multiculturalism. I want to focus on Okin’s definitions of
each of multiculturalism and feminism, and through this discussion to
articulate the definitional shift suggested in this commentary, the transition
of the headings in the first part gradually marking the stages in the
argument defended here that multiculturalism and feminism can, and
moreover ought to, be regarded as overlapping in regard to minority patri-
archy and, in those areas of overlap, are therefore synonymous.
Defining multiculturalism
Okin seems to equate multiculturalism with the preservation of the patri-
archal status quo, since she places it, in the following passage, in opposition
to feminist cultural reform when presenting the courses of action available
to a multicultural state faced with policy or regulatory decisions touching
upon cultural diversity:
it is by no means clear, from a feminist point of view, that minority rights are
part of the solution [as is claimed by some multiculturalists]; they may
exacerbate the problem. In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in
the context of a less patriarchal majority culture . . . [women] may be much
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better off . . . if the culture into which they were born were . . . either gradually
to become extinct (as its members became integrated into the surrounding
culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged and supported to substantially alter
itself so as to reinforce the equality, rather than the inequality, of women.
(Okin, 1998: 680 (original emphasis omitted))
Okin outlines three options in this passage: first, multiculturalism (in her
terminology ‘minority rights’ (cf. Raz, 1999 noting that her concern is
actually broader)); second, assimilation; and third, feminist cultural reform.
Okin’s preference is for reform, then assimilation, then multiculturalism.
Yet, as I have said, she is prepared to countenance situations, where the
counterbalancing factors are of the right magnitude, in which this order is
to be reversed and multiculturalism is to be preferred over the other two
options.
The problem here is that Okin appears to endorse the preservation of
the patriarchal status quo over feminist cultural reform when the counter-
balancing factors she lists could just as well be served by the reform option.
That is, there is no reason (except in the most egregious situations of diver-
sity-sourced conflict) to draw a distinction between multiculturalism and
reform here – the two can collapse into one, with a more feminist under-
standing of multiculturalism emerging which moves away from preserving
the patriarchal status quo (cf. Kymlicka 1989: 166–7 (distinguishing
between cultures as dynamic systems which change over time and cultures
as described at a given moment in time)). On this view, there is no need for
the continued support which Okin unconvincingly shows for multicultural-
ism (as defined by her), and her concession that multiculturalism can trump
feminism is indefensible in feminist terms.
This only quibbles with Okin’s definition of multiculturalism, but what
of her understanding of feminism? I shall argue in the next section that the
limitations of Okin’s definition of multiculturalism intermesh with those of
her definition of feminism – her apparent oversight of a more feminist
understanding of multiculturalism can be explained in terms of her negation
of a more multicultural understanding of feminism, especially in her
contributions to the feminist difference debate.
Defining feminism
Okin gives the impression that she imagines that general feminist theories
of justice, which she has so helped define (e.g. in Okin, 1979 and especially
1989), are sufficient in respect of all patriarchy – minority or otherwise. The
chief obstacle to the elimination of patriarchy in the minority context, on
this view, is the currency of multicultural politics which threaten to impede
the translation of feminist theory into practice within the minority context.
This explains the focus of her writing on multiculturalism, being an almost
entirely critical enterprise, with its argument centred on showing problems
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with defences of multiculturalism. This suggests that there is no need for
policy specifically targeting minority patriarchy but that, instead, it can
somehow be subsumed under feminist policy conceived from a more
general or universal perspective.
This impression is fortified by the propositions Okin advances more
directly in her contributions to the feminist difference debate, in which she
reacts against calls for account to be taken of difference between women,
and of the varieties of situations and contexts in which patriarchy arises.
Okin rehearses concern that the formulation of feminist policy might be
hindered in result, apparently fearing that heeding such calls might risk a
slide towards relativism and a less than optimal resolution of the problems
it is meant to address (e.g. Okin, 1995a). She prefers to defend the thesis in
that literature ‘that the problems of other women are “similar to ours but
more so” ’ (Okin, 1994: 8), the answer presumably being, to apply this
formulation to the minority context,1 to redouble efforts to enforce gener-
ally applicable laws in respect of minorities, and not to heed calls made in
favour of divergences from those laws under guise of multiculturalism.
Okin seems to set up the following two options for the state to adopt in
respect of minority patriarchy:
1. it could conduct policies of multiculturalism in respect of minority
patriarchy which would necessarily, according to Okin’s definition,
preserve or continue patriarchal forms of regulation; or
2. generally applicable state law (embodying the feminist principles
which Okin and others have helped articulate) could be applied by
the state in respect of minority patriarchy.
I leave open the question of whether application of general law would be
the product of gradual assimilation, whereby the regulatory practices of
minorities themselves cease (the assimilation option in the above-quoted
triumvirate). Or, alternatively, that generally applicable law would be
enforced so as to prevent the practices from having patriarchal regulatory
effects (cf. Chambers, 2002 making an argument along these lines) –
perhaps this second possibility is a version of Okin’s reform option, but it
is difficult to be precise given how she has unfortunately not expanded upon
how her preferred reform option is to be executed, short of consulting
women (further discussed below).
In the third part, I will suggest, when returning to the working definition
of minority patriarchy used here to look at the more systemic aspects it
excluded, that the first option is incoherent in Okin’s terms and does not
follow logically from her argument; and I have also ventured above that the
argument is indefensible in feminist terms. This leaves the second option,
that of relying on a generally applicable law. I argue below, in the next stage
of the redefinition of feminism ventured in this commentary, that one
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cannot rely on such laws to find remedies for minority patriarchy. In fact,
that argument is directed at both versions of the incompatibility thesis, and
it takes a pause in the next section to give an account of the opposite choice
approach, that of prioritizing multiculturalism over feminism with which it
is deemed incompatible.
Choosing multiculturalism
Echoing Okin’s language, Chandran Kukathas argues that it is ‘feminism
[which is] bad for multiculturalism’ (2001) and he is taken to represent the
opposite choice approach – in place of Okin’s choice of feminism, Kukathas
influentially chooses multiculturalism. Just as Okin chooses a particular
type of feminism, so too is Kukathas’s multiculturalism of a specific kind –
a libertarian or laissez-faire type of multiculturalism, in which minority
cultures, however patriarchal, ought basically to be left alone. The state
should strive for neutrality between competing conceptions of the good,
including as to the regulation of gender; it should adopt a position of
tolerance in respect of cultural diversity and difference.
This is not the multiculturalism against which Okin is primarily reacting
in the work considered thus far – she and Kukathas can be seen as allied in
countering the arguments of those advocating (as we see in the second part
of this commentary) the accommodation, rather than the mere toleration,
of difference. Kukathas and Okin are at one in thinking that state support
for minority cultures is potentially harmful to women. In Kukathas’s
version of the argument, ‘groups which act illiberally are,’ he says, ‘not
entitled to any special protections so that they might continue to live by
illiberal values’ (Kukathas, 2001: 92).
On his view, women would ‘receive some protection’ because they would
not be ‘required to accept a particular way of life’ (Kukathas, 1992: 125–6).
Furthermore, they must have the option to leave, to exercise rights of exit
in favour of the regulatory framework provided by generally applicable law.
As citizens of the state (Kukathas, 1991: 22), members of minority
communities would have access to state laws in combating patriarchy
suffered under operation of minority norms (Kukathas, 1992: 133); and,
crucially, the option of direct regulation by the state (i.e. exit) without
having to submit to (patriarchal) minority regulation.
Limitations of the choice approach
Although arguing from opposite ends of the choice-spectrum, Kukathas and
Okin both seem to rely on generally applicable law in assuaging concerns
regarding patriarchy. In their different ways, both advance remedies for
minority patriarchy by way of the universal application of the law in all
contexts, including in the minority context. As we have just seen, Kukathas
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performs this reliance explicitly; and I have suggested that Okin does so
indirectly – at least, this is what helps best make sense of her approach, in
spite of undeveloped textual references to the contrary (discussed below)
which are hard to square with the general thrust of her argument.
My reservations regarding reliance on generally applicable law are
directed particularly at Okin in the first instance and are then extended,
perversely given his opposing choice, against Kukathas, my discussion
dwelling in fact on the differences between them, in a bid more fairly to
bring out Okin’s position.
Defining multicultural feminism
One side of the feminist difference debate – the side against which Okin
reacts in that debate – calls for a more multicultural understanding of
feminism which recognizes that cultural difference may need to be taken into
account for feminist reasons. Universalist approaches to the formulation of
feminist policy may overlook or leave unchecked, so the argument goes, the
distinctive forms of patriarchy arising in the lives of women who are differ-
ently situated from the (usually unacknowledged) norm or referent.2
This argument is apposite in respect of minority patriarchy. Take the
example of divorce regulation in contemporary western society. Women
who are members of self-regulating minority communities may face
problems in respect of divorce which are particular to their membership in
those communities – and this is notably the case in communities subject to
sharia and halacha. These problems arise notwithstanding, and moreover
in the context of, the operation of generally applicable laws of the state,
themselves increasingly drawn up to achieve more just regulatory outcomes
particularly as to the equitable distribution of resources within the family.
Inequalities which arise in the operation of minority law on divorce affect
the ability of women to terminate their marriages and to bargain about the
terms of any eventual divorce on an equal footing with their husbands,
thereby undercutting the effectiveness of state law.
This is true regardless of whether particular policies of multiculturalism
are in place, whether they be policies of toleration or accommodation
(although clearly certain forms of accommodation could affect the gravity
of this situation, particularly as regards the more secular members of the
community, who might thereby be forced to submit to minority regulation
in cases where they might not otherwise have felt bound to do so (cf.
Reitman, 2005: 203, arguing that this is likely to be the case under the
accommodations proposed by Ayelet Shachar considered in the second part
of this commentary). The point to retain is that unless specific measures
are taken with regard to female members of minority cultures, generally
applicable laws embodying feminist principles are unlikely to remedy these
problems.
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Universalist approaches appear to overlook the need which the women
in question have for special treatment on the basis of their minority group
membership, in order to help remedy these problems or prevent them from
arising. It is not multiculturalism here which will destroy ‘recent advances’
made by ‘Western majority cultures, largely at the urging of feminists’
(Okin, 1999a: 19). To the contrary, if one understands multiculturalism to
follow from an observation that universal rights may not be sufficient to
protect the values these rights enshrine (as multiculturalists of the
accommodative hue (to be considered in the second part of this commen-
tary) would argue), then multiculturalism may be needed so that women in
these communities can benefit from the values of feminism which drive the
advances Okin has in mind. (And I ought to emphasize, while the values of
feminism may also be embodied in generally applicable law, and this helps
ground state action here, this law ought by no means to be considered the
sole repository or source of those values, as attested to by an increasingly
impressive body of feminist scholarship which draws its source in, and is
argued in the terms of, halacha and/or sharia).
Defining feminist multiculturalism/multicultural feminism
The same line of argument can be raised in answer to Kukathas’s
diametrically opposed choice of multiculturalism over feminism, for he
too, as we have seen, relies on generally applicable laws to protect women.
Just as such reliance was found to be inadequate in Okin’s case, the same
is true as regards Kukathas. The difference between them can be charac-
terized as a disagreement over how widely and comprehensively these
generally applicable laws should be drawn up, with Kukathas supporting
a libertarian approach and Okin, a comprehensive approach incorporating
the values of feminism. Because of this, the challenge is less troubling for
Kukathas, since he does not stake a commitment to realizing the values of
feminism, such that my argument that they would be unlikely to be so
realized under his framework is less of a challenge given the parameters
he sets.3
One can simply note that Kukathas’s deflection of feminist concern
seems too coincidental, prevaricating at times on the question of the place
of feminism in generally applicable law. While Kukathas holds to the
universal application of the law to all citizens, whatever their cultural
membership, he does not rule out the possibility, at least not in the context
of his earlier writing on multiculturalism,4 that these laws might reflect
principles a feminist would want in place in order to protect women against
patriarchy (cf. Barry, 2001 also arguing for the application of generally
applicable laws, although in antagonism to Kukathas’s version of the
argument, while also accepting (p. 162) the need for specific remedies for
minority patriarchy in some cases).
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Focusing on the difference between Okin and Kukathas here, one can
perhaps learn more about Okin’s preference for the reform option in the
triumvirate quoted above. I have suggested that by her silence on this issue,
she overlooks the feminist potential of multiculturalism. Remembering that
Okin and Kukathas both end up relying on generally applicable law in spite
of staking opposite positions on the choice-spectrum, in focusing on where
Okin wants to depart from Kukathas, I look to see whether my reading of
Okin’s silence needs adjustment.
While Okin’s early writings on multiculturalism did not target
Kukathas’s favoured multiculturalism, focusing instead on the alternative,
more accommodative kind, she has since taken aim at his version as well
(Okin, 2002). Subsequently acknowledging that she ‘agree[s] to a surpris-
ing extent’ with Kukathas (Okin, 2005: 85, fn. 8), his position has neverthe-
less caused her to argue that ‘the wider society [ought to] address the
discrimination [female members of patriarchal minorities] suffer from, just
as it would for its other citizens’ (Okin, 2002: 227 emphasis added for
reasons given below).
This invites a degree of hesitation in my earlier reading of Okin since,
on one level, she could be taken here to support a more multicultural
understanding of feminism than was imputed to her above by worrying that
it is not sufficient simply to offer women the option of direct regulation by
state institutions governed by the more universalist feminist principles she
advances. One can draw particular significance from the fact that Okin
should have considered the need for dedicated state action in respect of
minority patriarchy, apparently not content merely to rely, as Kukathas
does, on women’s access to generally applicable law.
Perhaps, on this view, the female member-consultation she counsels can
be taken to have a wider purpose than I have suggested elsewhere
(Reitman, 2000: 302–3), portraying it merely as a mechanism for discover-
ing the full extent of the incompatibility between multiculturalism and
feminism which might otherwise be hidden from view in the deliberative
process. Perhaps consultation is meant to generate remedies for minority
patriarchy specifically, appearing thereby to recognize that they might not
be provided solely through generally applicable law. Perhaps this, then, can
be taken as the manner by which Okin intended her preferred reform
option to be realized, such that her silence on the issue ought not to be so
determinant to my critique.
This alternative reading of Okin is somewhat supported by minor
passages in her contributions to the feminist difference debate, in which she
has, most notably, been drawn to concede that ‘many of women’s concerns
and needs vary from one social and cultural context to another and that the
best ways of resisting oppression are also likely to be context specific’
(Okin, 1995b: 515).
Ultimately, however, although Okin expresses preference for the reform
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option, she says too little about how it is to be implemented by the state.
While consultation with women is undeniably necessary, it is not sufficient,
and Okin’s more recent struggles to reconcile liberalism with democracy in
this context (Okin, 2005) give a clue as to the difficulties involved, without,
unfortunately, progressing much beyond the resolution she offered in her
initial writings on the subject.
Returning to Okin’s position vis-à-vis Kukathas, one can recast Okin’s
concern as attaching not to the principle of exit itself, and the application
of generally applicable law it yields, but to the difficulties involved in
exercising rights of exit; making them, on their own, an unreliable mechan-
ism for assuring protection against abuses arising in the operation of
minority regulation (an argument with which I am sympathetic (Reitman,
2005)). Remembering that the difference between Okin and Kukathas can
essentially be reduced to a dispute about how comprehensively to draw up
generally applicable laws, Okin’s answer here might simply be to supple-
ment their common approach with more comprehensive mechanisms to
ensure that rights of exit can actually be exercised. (I have suggested else-
where (Reitman, 2005) that measures to make exit more realizable are
better understood as arguments in favour of a more comprehensive set of
universal laws than as guarantees attaching to rights of exit per se.) When
Okin notes her agreement with Kukathas, she proceeds to highlight that
their agreement concerns ‘the practical application of [their] respective
theories’ (Okin, 2005: 85, fn. 8). This suggests that the end result each wants
to achieve is broadly similar, namely the application of generally applicable
law. On this view, the ‘just as’ of the wording written in answer to Kukathas
harks back to the ‘similar . . .but more so’ of her earlier contributions to the
feminist difference debate, thereby supporting my original reading of Okin.
COMPATIBILIT Y: BALANCING MULTICULTURALISM AND
FEMINISM
Okin has been criticized for being too sweeping in her account of minority
cultures (e.g. Nussbaum 1999; al-Hibri 1999; An-Na’im 1999) and many of
these critics highlight the existence of alternative accounts of many of the
cultural phenomena which drive Okin’s critique of multiculturalism. While
few of these critics would dispute Okin’s warnings as to the dangers of
multicultural policy which is insufficiently attentive to patriarchy, they ask
for a more balanced picture.
I now consider approaches which capture this notion of balance and give
it an executive role in the principles they advance, by which to pursue in
tandem the twin values of multiculturalism and feminism. Although this
approach is more promising, I argue it too fails, on the terms suggested, to
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advance an adequate framework for policy-making in respect of minority
patriarchy – here, the balance is likely to continue to tip more heavily on
the side of multiculturalism in practice and the disproportionate burdens
borne by women, noted all round in the debate, might simply remain
unchecked or, worse, they might become heavier still.
Ways of balancing multiculturalism and feminism
The principal interlocutor both of Okin and Kukathas in these arguments
is Will Kymlicka, who adopts the third of the approaches identified at the
outset, with his vision of ‘multiculturalism and feminism as allies engaged
in related struggles . . . [, with] a common interest’ (1999b: 34; cf. Shachar,
2001: 23, fn. 25), such that there is no need for the kind of choice for which
Kukathas and Okin argue.
Kymlicka defends a more accommodative form of multiculturalism than
Kukathas, ‘argu[ing] that liberals . . . should endorse certain group-
differentiated rights for [cultural] minorities. But this endorsement is
always a conditional and qualified one. The demands of some groups
exceed what liberalism can accept’ (1995: 152), he says. To establish the
limits of acceptability here, Kymlicka draws a distinction between ‘good’
and ‘bad’ multiculturalism (1996: 22).
Good multiculturalism answers a minority’s ‘claim against the larger
society’ which is ‘intended to protect the group from the impact of external
decisions’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 35). These, he terms ‘external protections’ and
they ‘involve inter-group relations [by which] the [cultural] group . . .
seek[s] to protect its distinct existence and identity by limiting the impact
of the decisions of the larger society’ (1995: 36).
Bad multiculturalism, on the other hand, aims to facilitate what are
termed ‘internal restrictions’ – that is, ‘claim[s] of a group against its own
members’ which are ‘intended to protect the group from the destabilizing
impact of internal dissent’ (1995: 35). ‘Internal restrictions involve intra-
group relations’ in which the cultural minority ‘seek[s] the use of state
power to restrict the liberty of its own members in the name of group
solidarity[,]. . . rais[ing] the danger of individual oppression’ (1995: 36),
such as that implicated by patriarchy.
Kymlicka ‘argue[s] that liberals can and should endorse certain external
protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject
internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and
revise traditional authorities and practices’ (1995: 37).
Okin’s critique of Kymlicka does not fully grapple with his external
protection/internal restriction distinction, which is frustrating given how
central it is to his deflection of feminist concerns (cf. Reitman, 2000: 301),
and he continues to appeal to this distinction in his responses both to Okin
and to others raising similar objections (Kymlicka, 1999a, 1999b). He makes
ETHNICITIES 5(2)228
229
two concessions in these replies, but they ultimately serve to bolster his
original distinction. First, he suggests the ‘need [for] a more subtle account
of internal restrictions which helps . . . identify limitations on the freedom
of women within [minority] groups’ (1999b: 32). The other concession hints
at the need for better institutional design, recasting ‘the goal . . . [as being]
(a) to ensure that groups have the external protections they need, while (b)
creating the institutional safeguards which prevent groups from imposing
internal restrictions’ (1999a: 127, fn. 7).
Although Kymlicka has not yet directly taken up the challenge of coming
up with this more subtle account of internal restrictions and of the insti-
tutional safeguards needed to ward them off, the work of another theorist,
Ayelet Shachar, can be viewed as an attempt to do so.
Shachar characterizes the subject-matter of social regulation as ‘social
arenas’ which are ‘internally divisible into submatters – multiple, separable,
yet complementary, legal concerns’ (Shachar, 2000c: 418). The family, for
instance, whose regulation is the focus of much of the multiculturalism/
feminism debate, can be divided into ‘two submatters: . . . a demarcating
function [which] . . . regulates . . . status [and a distributive function which
regulates] . . . the economic . . . consequences of . . . status’ (2000c: 419).
Even though Shachar was initially critical of Kymlicka’s distinction
(Shachar, 1999: 103, fn. 23), her multiculturalism is now billed as ‘utilizing
external protections to reduce internal restrictions’ (Shachar, 2001: 117). To
do so, she proposes external protection in the form of ‘devolution of
authority to the community’ so as ‘to reduce subordinating internal restric-
tions’ (Shachar, 2000c: 407). For now, glossing over the technicality of how
it is to be achieved, Shachar’s calculus could be summarized as follows: if
groups acquire external protection on the terms she advances, they would
be given incentive and better conditions by which to reduce instances of
internal restriction.5
In this vein, Shachar would grant minorities jurisdiction or regulatory
power over the demarcating function of family regulation (Shachar, 2000b:
203) – echoing Kymlicka’s language, she says that this function of family
law is ‘more outwardly looking or externally focused’ and is concerned with
the group’s relationship ‘vis-à-vis the larger society’ (Shachar, 2001: 50). On
the other hand, Shachar would require the state to retain jurisdiction over
family law’s distributive function, which she correctly identifies as the
primary engine of patriarchal regulation in this context – this function of
family law is said, again mirroring Kymlicka’s distinction, to deal with
matters which are ‘more interpersonal or inwardly directed’ (Shachar, 2001:
50, cf. 2000b: 203).
REITMAN ● MULTICULTURALISM AND FEMINISM
Limitations of the balancing approach
In this section I shall argue that balancing frameworks risk simply repro-
ducing unresolved conflicts between the different ethical considerations
arising here (cf. Benhabib, 2002: 128 noting that Shachar’s proposals ‘may
not be resolving the paradox of multicultural vulnerability but simply
permitting its recirculation’). My focus continues to be on the more
explicitly feminist of the representative theorists considered in this
commentary:6 just as, in the preceding section, my critique of Kukathas was
tangential and even parenthetical to my critique of Okin, so too in this
section, my critique of Kymlicka relies upon more in-depth engagement
with Shachar’s arguments – with her modifications of his arguments, her
proposals offer a good testing-ground for assessing whether his defence of
multiculturalism can survive feminist scrutiny.
One should not, however, underestimate the difference between
Kymlicka and Shachar here – differences which can be characterized in two
ways: on the one hand, Shachar can be taken to have improved Kymlicka’s
arguments when viewed from a feminist perspective, especially in the
emphasis she places on feminist concerns, and the way she manipulates
Kymlicka’s external protection/internal restriction distinction to reflect this
order of concern. On the other hand, however, paradoxically, Shachar’s
proposals are also potentially more costly for women than are Kymlicka’s,
at least in regard to minorities who are to receive less extensive forms of
accommodation under the multiculturalism he defends.7
As we shall see, Kymlicka’s way of handling the challenge of minority
patriarchy is to try to minimize or avoid it in the operation of his theory
of multicultural justice – to have multiculturalism be about the pursuit of
intercultural justice while avoiding, as far as possible, aggravation of
other forms of oppression. While this is obviously preferable to the
alternative, namely multiculturalism which disregards gender-based and
other forms of oppression, this formula merely requires that multi-
culturalism should not impede feminism. Yet the argument made in the
first part of the commentary on the basis of a more multicultural under-
standing of feminism holds that multiculturalism may be needed for
feminist reasons.
Kymlicka states his project to be an observation of policies which have
functioned successfully in practice and to work back from there to suggest
how ‘this general view of the landscape’ can be theorized (1995: 1–2). He
has, I think, come up with a compelling account which has been defining of
the terms in which multiculturalism is discussed today. Yet he overlooks a
significant form of multicultural accommodation and his account is there-
fore incomplete.8
In this piece, I want to suggest another defence of multiculturalism which
is raised from a feminist perspective. While this is meant to replace existing
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accounts in regard to policy-making which directly targets minority
patriarchy, it also serves to deflect the sort of challenge on which the
exchange between Okin and Kymlicka turns, thereby enabling the basic
defence of multiculturalism to survive in a whole host of other domains of
policy, provided such policy is made and implemented on terms which seek
to minimize the more systemic forms of patriarchy (i.e. that which was
excluded from the working definition, about which more is said in the third
part of this commentary).
At first sight, Shachar’s modified version of Kymlicka’s distinction
between external protection and internal restriction could be taken better
to capture the idea that multiculturalism may be needed for feminist
reasons. She wants to ‘utiliz[e] external protections to reduce internal
restrictions’ (Shachar, 2001: 117; cf. 2000c: 407) when Kymlicka simply
wants to avoid internal restrictions, with provision of external protection
being his driving concern and primary focus.
Expanding the argument made in the first part of the commentary
regarding minority divorce regulation: here, justified claims for accommo-
dation might be advanced to help a minority community’s own regulatory
institutions achieve more effective and just regulatory outcomes. From a
feminist perspective, these claims are most compelling or best founded in
cases where the problems women face stem primarily from abuse by their
husbands of underlying patriarchal strains within minority law. Forms of
accommodation may be needed in order to make up for the institutional
powerlessness of the community’s regulatory bodies, particularly as regards
enforcement, thereby harnessing the power of the state’s enforcement
mechanisms so as to afford the system of minority regulation greater
coercive force in policing instances in which husbands seek to abuse
minority regulation (cf. Reitman, 2005: 207).
The persuasiveness of these arguments depends on a rather benign view
of the regulatory institutions which are to be empowered by way of multi-
cultural accommodation, and here I think all feminists would have cause to
worry – whether they adopt a universalist or more multicultural perspec-
tive – for there are instances in which the source of the difficulties
encountered by women is not simply the abusive deployment of minority
rules by their husbands but is more systemic in nature, attaching to the way
minority laws are interpreted and applied.
While my focus here is on instances in which the system breaks down,
one should not forget that this is a partial picture and that there are no
doubt many courageous arbiters of these laws who are committed to
ensuring their just application, as far as they can within the law, such that
the argument as to their empowerment through multiculturalism becomes
more persuasive from a feminist perspective. But it is noteworthy that many
of those most closely involved with the operation of the minority laws in
question are deeply pessimistic on this issue.9
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In the space available here, I can merely note that while the argument
in favour of external protection to reduce internal restriction may be
compelling in principle, this endorsement comes with a number of
conditions to reflect a more realistic understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages involved in multicultural accommodation. My point here is
simply to highlight that Shachar’s approach does not sufficiently assure that
these conditions are met (although she too has argued that they are
necessary).
To the contrary, by embracing Kymlicka’s external protection/internal
restriction formula and, more generally, his balancing approach to the
configuration of multiculturalism and feminism, Shachar actually serves to
highlight its shortcomings as a mechanism for distinguishing between multi-
culturalism which is defensible from a feminist perspective, indeed that
which is necessary from this perspective; and that which is not.
Under Shachar’s model, a lot of external protection ends up being
justified, empowering patriarchal regulatory structures for doubtful gain as
I shall argue in this part of the commentary, and notably without guaran-
teeing that accommodation would be set in place for the sorts of reasons
advanced from the multicultural feminist perspective sketched in the first
part of this commentary.10 For example, in relation to minority divorce (the
example she herself uses), Shachar envisages that the cultural minority
would, in the first instance, automatically acquire exclusive and compulsory
authority over the determination of marital status; whereas the state would
retain jurisdiction over matters ancillary to divorce, thereby enabling its
more equitable financial distribution rules to apply automatically upon
separation (Shachar, 2001: Chapter 6). Indeed, Shachar argues for more
accommodation than Kymlicka in some cases and the example used here
is one of them (Kymlicka, 1995: 42 approvingly noting that there ‘has
been no movement towards giving legal recognition to talaq [Islamic]
divorces’ – indicating a preference for toleration rather than accommo-
dation in these circumstances).11
Shachar’s proposals are meant to provide mechanisms by which to give
‘vulnerable insiders meaningful access to effective legal remedies’
(Shachar, 2000c: 420) and ‘clearly delineated choice options’ (Shachar,
2001: 118), as well as incentives for minority cultures to engage in feminist
cultural reform (2001: 121–2). Yet these mechanisms are not up to the task
in two regards. One concerns the central place that rights of exit continue
to occupy in the framework she proposes. They are meant to protect
women by offering them an alternative to community status regulation,
should patriarchy persist; and the threat of exit is also meant to give minori-
ties incentive to alter their codes so as to remove its patriarchal elements.
As I have argued elsewhere, however, there is little cause for placing
reliance upon the transformative and protective properties which advocates
of rights of exit claim of them (Reitman, 2005). The second concern, and
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the one on which I shall focus here, stems from the fact that, while giving
a compelling account of the dangers of multiculturalism when viewed from
a feminist perspective, Shachar seems then to underplay these challenges
in the proposals she puts forward.
In this regard, she can be taken to have offered little improvement upon
Kymlicka, whose multiculturalism is the target in her observation of its
dangers, but who can be criticized on similar terms. Kymlicka appears to
downplay the desire for internal restrictions when setting out his distinction
(1995: 38–42), minimizing claims for internal restrictions on the basis that
they ‘are . . . defended . . . as unavoidable by-products of external protec-
tions, rather than desirable in and of themselves’ (1995: 44) (although one
should note that this account sits somewhat uncomfortably next to what he
says in criticism of others (1995: 96)).
Shachar performs a similar move when justifying her proposed reparti-
tion of the different regulatory functions of family law. She suggests that
the minority ought to have power over status-determination so as not to
‘undermin[e its] controls over the definition of its membership boundaries’
(1998a: 299), which Shachar correctly identifies as being of primordial
importance to the community. The distributive function of family law, on
the other hand, would apparently be of lesser importance to minority inter-
ests, and therefore regulatory authority to perform this function can be
allocated exclusively to the state so as to protect women against abusive
deployment of minority norms. This function is not, she asserts, ‘unique to
group members’ but an aspect of divorce which all divorcing couples must
face, regardless of their cultural membership (1998: 300), thereby implying
that minorities would relatively easily cede authority in this domain.
There is no dispute with Shachar’s account of minority interest in
controlling its boundaries; nor of distributive issues being the primary
engine of patriarchy. The problem stems, rather, from how Shachar formu-
lates her response to these phenomena in terms of jurisdiction-splitting.
This approach seems too blunt, appearing to underplay important connec-
tions which exist between the different functions of family regulation high-
lighted in the ensuing discussion. These turn on the proposition that the
distributive function of family law is one of the principal mechanisms by
which group members, both men and women, are, at least in the modern
multicultural setting, controlled or policed by minority regulatory bodies –
a function which, then, can be regarded as central to minority law
enforcement. I want to highlight two problems which stem from this: (1)
minorities may not acquire the sense of security Shachar claims, which
undercuts a strand of her own calculus of granting external protection for
the sake of reducing internal restriction; and, more significantly to the thesis
defended here, (2) the enforcement-function of minority distributive regu-
lation is potentially useful in policing the abusive husbands alluded to
above. Shachar’s jurisdiction-splitting model, however, paradoxically seems
REITMAN ● MULTICULTURALISM AND FEMINISM
to frustrate this in the manner in which she suggests regulatory authority to
be shared between minority and state:
1. Shachar claims that her proposals will ‘for the first time’ (1998b: 111)
make the elimination of minority patriarchy ‘finally [seem] possible’
(2000c: 423). An important element to Shachar’s calculus rests on a
reckoning that if minorities acquire external protection on the terms
she specifies, with assured authority over regulation of demarcation
or status issues, they would thereby gain a sense of security that
would contribute to greater acceptance of feminist reform on
questions of demarcation. Yet distributive regulation, in which
minorities are compulsorily to have no part, is likely to continue to
have considerable importance to the minority system, including in
reference to its work of boundary-demarcation, some of which, as we
see below (at point 2), can help rather than hinder it in more justly
marking its borders. Depriving minorities of power over the
distributive function makes it doubtful that the group would derive
the sense of security under Shachar’s proposals which she claims.12
One can get a sense of the importance rabbinical courts attach to
their regulatory roles in respect of distributive matters here by
observing the fierce jurisdictional contests over ancillary divorce
issues which take place between secular and rabbinical courts in
Israel.13 On status issues, rabbinical courts already have mandatory
jurisdiction but they vie for jurisdiction on distributive matters.
Although the religious court system has maximal security in respect
of demarcation as a result of its compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction over status determination – precisely the jurisdictional
tranche its minority counterparts would acquire under Shachar’s
model – it seeks to assert its power over the distributive aspects of
divorce regulation as well, putting pressure on women not to submit
the determination of ancillary matters to secular family law courts
(e.g. Ragen, 2001).
Although other facets of Shachar’s calculus have been ignored in
the foregoing discussion (notably the place of exit rights in her
framework), these are unlikely substantially to change the
circumstances that produce the phenomenon so palpable in the
Israeli jurisdictional contests. While, at a formal level, a minority
community’s leadership might well be expected to enter, as intimated
by Shachar, into the kind of power-sharing compromise she
recommends, this may simply be the product of multicultural politics
– a necessary expedience to which the group would accede, at an
official level, in order to obtain its ‘slice of the jurisdictional pie’
(Shachar, 2001: 120); that is, so as to acquire what she posits to be, as
it were, the ‘carrot’ of compulsory divorce jurisdiction (the threat of
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exit being the ‘stick’). There is little guarantee, however, that, at a
more informal level, the group would cede control over the
distributive function of family law. To the contrary, there is every
indication that the women who are currently subject to blackmail in
the private or more informal sphere as a result of abusive
deployment of minority regulation, would continue to come under
pressure to bargain away whatever they have – under Shachar’s
model, their state law (distributive) entitlements – in order to avoid
having to exit in favour of the state’s (demarcation) regime (cf.
Reitman, 2005: 203 making this argument with reference to the exit
features of Shachar’s model).
2. I have just argued that Shachar’s framework may fail to prevent
unjust distributive regulation, especially when one takes account of
informal levels of regulation, which are likely to survive in the
shadows of the formal structure she proposes. I argue now that her
framework may also serve to frustrate the more just distributive
regulation I suggested multicultural accommodation should seek to
foster. This is because she seems to want to rule out minority and
state cooperation in regulation of distributive matters when such
cooperation may offer solutions to the problems involved here. This
is the case in the Jewish divorce example Shachar uses as the primary
illustration of her proposed framework. Shachar seems to have
overlooked the fact that such regulatory cooperation is entailed in
some of the most promising solutions advanced by way of
multicultural accommodation to the problems arising here, especially
in the diaspora.14 In order for these mechanisms to be effective,
account must be taken of Jewish law justifications for them, and a
great deal of care is required here, as the argument is controversial.
Deliberation and cooperation would be required, probably on a
case-by-case basis, to ensure that the right sorts of remedies are
made available from a Jewish law perspective. While there are
potential difficulties with these measures in practice, which have to
do with technical rules of Jewish law, such difficulties can, indeed
need to, be addressed in the policy-making and implementation
process.15
Although Shachar is keen to foster deliberation between group
and state, the sort of deliberation she counsels is rather different
since the distributive function of family law is to be off the agenda
from the outset (given that, in Shachar’s Jewish divorce hypothetical,
the calculus turns on the state’s acquiring exclusive jurisdiction over
this aspect of regulation), and deliberation is to centre, instead,
primarily on how each entity’s distinct regulatory powers – the state,
its distributive powers and the group, its demarcation powers – are to
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be exercised so as to achieve regulation in each particular case; and,
especially, on providing a right of exit from the group’s regulatory
jurisdiction over status-determination, should the problems women
face be enduring (Shachar, 2001: Chapter 6, especially at 121–4; cf.
Reitman, 2005: 206, fn. 6 on the potential counterproductive effect of
centring deliberation on exit rights).
In this light, Shachar’s more concrete proposals appear
paradoxically (partially) to repeat what I have suggested to be Okin’s
oversights: like her, Shachar seems to give up too easily on the
prospect of finding equitable solutions from within the minority
system of regulation. On distributive matters, Shachar opposes
accommodation – indeed it is a crucial part of her calculus –
allocating this function instead exclusively to the state, in order that
generally applicable law should govern in the minority context, an
argument which is reminiscent to that described above in reference
to Okin’s comparable reliance on state law as a solution to minority
patriarchy. The practical effectiveness of the Jewish divorce
accommodations discussed above, however, are premised on the
need for equitable Jewish law distributive determinations to be
enforced, a need which is served by enforcing minority
determinations through the more coercive apparatus of state law. As
Okin overlooked this potential, so too does Shachar – both of them
seem too readily to turn to generally applicable law to find solutions,
albeit that, in Shachar’s case, this is merely to prevent women from
having to pay distributive penalties whereas, in Okin’s case, reliance
on state law seems more generalized.
In closing, I want to suggest that the problem with the balancing approaches
considered here is precisely the balance which, in their different ways,
both Shachar and Kymlicka want to ‘strike . . . between the accommo-
dation of minority group traditions, on the one hand, and the protection of
individuals’ citizenship rights, on the other’ (Shachar, 2001: 1) – both
theorists ‘striv[ing] for the reduction of injustice between groups,’ in
Shachar’s words, while working towards ‘the enhancement of justice within
them’ (2001: 4); or, in Kymlicka’s words, for ‘freedom within the minority
group, and equality between the minority and majority groups’ (Kymlicka,
1995: 152).
This balancing approach would be likely to continue the phenomenon
by which women have to bear disproportionate burdens under multi-
cultural policies, a phenomenon which Shachar herself and other feminist
scholars have emphasized in their critiques of multiculturalism. If the
balance is held between these twin objectives, instances of minority patri-
archy might well continue to be ‘the unavoidable by-products’ (1995: 44) of
measures taken to satisfy the group-focused ethical concerns they identify
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on one side of the balance. While these may not be ‘desirable in and of
themselves’ (1995: 44), they may simply be unavoidable.
This sort of wager is not eliminated in the proposals of Kymlicka and
Shachar. Although they do not squarely confront it, its presence can be felt
in the evasive arguments which each makes in respect of enduring minority
patriarchy: Shachar ultimately relies on exit, even though she herself
recognizes its limitations in her critique of Kukathas (cf. Reitman, 2005);
and Kymlicka performs an anti-interventionist retreat, at least as regards
certain minorities, in relation to which his axiomatic external protection/
internal restriction distinction is not to be coercively enforced (Kymlicka,
1995: Chapter 8).
Two arguments can be teased out from the foregoing discussion by which
to support granting minority groups forms of accommodation in reference
to minority patriarchy. One of them, derived from Shachar’s contributions
to the debate, which, as we have seen, most informs the manner in which
jurisdictions are split under her model, is that of boundary-marking. The
problem, however, from a feminist perspective, is that cultural boundaries
tend to be marked over women’s bodies (a phenomenon well noted in
multicultural feminist scholarship (e.g. Yuval-Davis, 1980, 1989 and 1997)
and by Shachar herself (e.g. 2000a: 76, 2000c: 394)). This comes out starkly
in the Jewish divorce example, where community boundaries are marked
literally through patriarchal control over the womb, assuring a husband’s
ownership over his wife’s reproductive capacities (e.g. generally Adler,
1998: Chapter 5; Hauptman 1998: Chapter 3, and Wegner, 1988 describing
Jewish marriage law on terms of the husband’s acquisition of his wife).
Control is effected here through penalties which impact on demarcation
issues, in that children born to a woman considered married to another are
deprived of full membership status in the community (cf. Reitman, 2005:
192). Women pay distributive penalties so as to avoid suffering penalties at
the level of community demarcation. Although Shachar’s model is meant
to encourage reform so as to eliminate these penalties from arising, such
reform cannot be expected on the terms she advances and, in its absence,
women are likely to continue to pay penalties, whether distributive or
otherwise. If, as Shachar intends, the distributive penalties were somehow
prevented from arising (both formally and informally, which I argued above
to be unlikely), women might continue to pay non-distributive penalties to
avoid these demarcation penalties – they might, for instance, have to forego
childbearing in their remaining reproductive years, even undergoing
unwanted abortions in order to avoid having children not entitled to the full
benefit of membership in the community (cf. Radoszkowicz, 2004).
More needs to be done to prevent these injustices. The second argument
for granting forms of accommodation in respect of minority patriarchy
helps here since it centres on empowering community leaders to achieve
more effective and just regulation. Although Shachar proposes her
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jurisdiction-splitting model precisely so as to avoid unjust regulatory
outcomes, that model is built too much around the first of these arguments,
with its emphasis on boundary-demarcation in the manner in which juris-
dictions are to be split between minority and state. Her ear bent more to
the first argument, she seems to have been deafened to the second since her
concrete proposals would be likely to frustrate it precisely where it seems
to have most promise. In this light, the balancing approach appears
obfuscatory, leading to arguments in favour of external protection which
are hard to justify from a feminist perspective; and perhaps even frustrat-
ing, as we saw in the Jewish divorce example, other arguments which could
be. I suggest below that an explanation can be found for this in the place
of more mainstream defences of multiculturalism in the balance here, with
one side seemingly weighing down heavier than the other.
SYNONYMIT Y: FEMINIST MULTICULTURALISM AND
MULTICULTURAL FEMINISM
I have ventured in this commentary that what is needed is not a choice
between multiculturalism and feminism, as posited by the incompatibilitists
Okin and Kukathas, but a reconceptualization of these two political
projects, with the aim of bringing to the fore a more multicultural under-
standing of feminism which thereby permits the identification of a form of
multiculturalism which is more feminist. This is not achieved by seeking to
create a balance between the two political projects, as ventured by the
compatibilists Kymlicka and Shachar. To the contrary, this balancing
approach can obscure feminist reasons for multiculturalism precisely
because of the attempt to marry these with more mainstream defences of
multiculturalism. As a result of this process of combination, the putative
incompatibility between multiculturalism and feminism (raised, for
instance, by Okin) seems to resurface (cf Reitman, 2005: 203 contending
that Shachar’s arguments serve mainstream multicultural objectives more
than they do feminist ones), thereby destabilizing the claim underlying this
approach that they are in fact, or can be made to be, compatible.
This suggests that one needs to drop the idea of balance here, in order
to ensure that the side which loses out in the wager underlying the balanc-
ing approach is not obscured from view; so as to allow arguments defend-
ing multiculturalism from a feminist perspective to hold sway in the
formulation of policy. What is needed to configure multiculturalism and
feminism, then, is not choice or balance but, quite simply, new definitions.
In this concluding part, I want to bring to the fore an alternative configur-
ation of multiculturalism and feminism underlying the foregoing argument,
which highlights a definitional synonymity between them, as a substitute for
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a conception based on notions of compatibility or incompatibility. I want
here to defend this notion of synonymity between multiculturalism and
feminism and highlight its salience in identifying principles of justice which
ought to govern the formulation of policy. The foregoing argument was
limited to a specific (and indeed controversial) definition of ‘minority patri-
archy’ and I want here also to return to the working definition given, to look
at the aspects it excluded – namely, the more systemic aspects of patriarchy
– and, through this, to consider the limitations of the synonymity thesis
defended in this paper.
My defence is structured in what follows as a response to three sets of
objections: two raised from a multicultural perspective, and the third, from
a feminist perspective. These objections are made from a more mainstream
standpoint than I have been using up to now, in distinction to the kind of
perspective which has supported the synonymity thesis. Do they succeed in
challenging this thesis?
The objection from multiculturalism I
One objection to the synonymity thesis is that it appears to imply a lesser
commitment to assuring the values which appear on the other side of the
balance in the approaches described in the second part of the commentary,
thereby suggesting that ‘injustice between groups’ might be lost from view
in the process of securing the ‘enhancement of justice within them’
(Shachar, 2001: 4). At this point, the working definition of minority patri-
archy used here helps dispel some of the concern. The working definition
was given for pragmatic reasons, a principal one being that it helps to
separate out two areas of policy – one, as per the working definition, which
directly targets individual or specific practices of patriarchy; and the other,
responding to the more systemic aspects excluded from the definition. By
defining minority patriarchy solely in reference to practices, and by specific-
ally excluding the more systemic aspects of patriarchy, one also thereby
excludes considerable domains of distinctiveness in which the mainstream
arguments for multiculturalism are, subject to the comments made in the
next section, not disturbed by arguments made thus far.
The objection might, however, continue: what of policy in respect of
minority patriarchy? Why should the other side of the balance be taken out
of the picture here? My contention is that it would enter the picture
precisely because of the work of making multiculturalism and feminism
synonymous in the redefinitions of each which have been proposed here.
The synonymity thesis offered as a tactical way of reversing the wager I
argued at the end of second part could be detected in the balancing
approaches considered there, in which minority patriarchy was found to be
likely to remain the unavoidable by-product of measures taken to foster
justice between groups. Under the synonymity thesis, this wager is reversed,
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reflecting the fact that those who suffer most under minority patriarchy are,
by definition, women.16
By highlighting the areas in which multiculturalism and feminism can be
regarded as synonymous – namely, in relation to aspects of patriarchy
included in the working definition – the synonymity approach helps better
to pinpoint where attention should rest in trying to configure multicultural-
ism and feminism, more accurately generating policy which reflects this
disparity of harm. This should serve more precisely to separate good
multiculturalism from bad, to borrow Kymlicka’s phrasing, than do the
balancing approaches he and others have articulated, thereby potentially
minimizing gender-based vulnerability considerably. While appreciable
amounts of accommodation may well continue to be defensible using
the synonymity approach, it more accurately permits the designation of
multiculturalism which is indeed good for women, whereas the balancing
approach seems to end up defending forms of accommodation which
may well continue to be met with claims that multiculturalism is bad for
women.
The objection from feminism
The proposition that mainstream defences of multiculturalism survive
feminist scrutiny in a whole host of areas not included in my definition of
minority patriarchy might have been disputed by Okin, in relation to whom
that definition is most controversial, given her emphasis on the more
systemic aspects of minority patriarchy excluded from my working defi-
nition. In her arguments against multiculturalism, she worries particularly
about ‘socialization into inferior roles, resulting in lack of self-esteem or a
sense of entitlement’ and she expresses concern for ‘cultures and religions
whose female members are devalued and imbibe their sense of inferiority
virtually from birth’ (1998: 675).
The move to separate out patriarchal practices from this type of systemic
patriarchy in my definition would seem then to miss the point. My
contention is that the point would not be missed but simply reflected in the
conditions which ought to attach to more mainstream defences of multi-
culturalism when they apply to areas of cultural distinctiveness not encom-
passed in the working definition used here, conditions upon which I expand
briefly in this section.
The working definition’s appeal is that it helps to see a way out of the
incoherence noted in the first part of this commentary, regarding Okin’s
support for multiculturalism. Since patriarchy is, as Okin says, systemic, she
ought to have rejected multiculturalism, presumably to allow assimilation
to occur. As noted by Janet Halley in her commentary on the Okin/
Kymlicka debate (Halley, 1999: 100), there is an ‘empirical’ disagreement
between them here, stemming from Okin’s admonition that ‘far fewer
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cultures than Kymlicka seems to think will be able to claim group rights
under his liberal justification’ (1999a: 21). That is, multiculturalism would
seem difficult to justify on Okin’s terms once account is taken of the
systemic forms of patriarchy which Kymlicka’s ‘more subtle account of
internal restrictions’ (1999b: 32) would have to include. In fact, then, Okin’s
endorsement of multiculturalism seems merely temporary, surviving only
in the initial stages of policy making in which the choice between multi-
culturalism and feminism is to be effected. Once Okin’s version of the
balance is applied (during these stages), multiculturalism ought, on Okin’s
terms, logically to be ruled out, such that few cultures would indeed be able
to claim the benefit of multiculturalism. Yet Okin continues to endorse
multiculturalism in later writing, stressing that the ‘treatment of women
within groups should be an important factor, but not the only factor, in
negotiation about group rights’ (2005: 73).
The distinction upon which my working definition of minority patriarchy
is based serves to separate out an area in which multiculturalism can more
coherently be endorsed. By accepting the defence of more mainstream
defences of multiculturalism, notwithstanding the enduring systemic
features of patriarchy which drives this objection, one better grounds
what seems to be Okin’s intuitive reluctance to reject multiculturalism
outright. If Okin does indeed want, as she has later explained, ‘to resolve
the incompatibility of feminism and multiculturalism so as to minimize the
likelihood that societies would be faced with a stark choice between the
two’ (2005: 71), the working definition, and its separation of two areas of
policy making, is offered here as a more coherent framework for doing so,
even though, at first sight, it may appear controversial.17
I shall not say much on the second area of policy articulated here, since
it does not address the aims of this commentary, being to signal problems
of orientation in the configuration of multiculturalism and feminism. At this
level, in regard to areas other than those directly implicating minority patri-
archy (as defined), the idea of balancing multiculturalism with feminism
seems, at least in the first instance, to be more defensible: while answering
the justice claims of groups here, the state must also take care to address
the more systemic aspects of patriarchy which have been excluded from the
working definition on which the synonymity thesis has been based, but
which may nevertheless endure.
In thinking about how to put this balance into practice, I maintain that
the synonymity thesis continues to have salience, indeed more salience than
the approaches rejected here. Many of the same reasons that have
motivated the argument here, rejecting these approaches in respect of
minority patriarchy (as defined), would also seem apposite in respect of
policy-making to attend to the more systemic aspects of patriarchy. Okin’s
proposals boil down to consultation with women and here she forms part
of a developing consensus that deliberation is the way forward in trying
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to balance multiculturalism and feminism. As I have said, however,
deliberation is necessary but not sufficient. Deliberative principles are
needed to structure how consultation with women is to proceed and, in
regard to policy targeting systemic patriarchy, these can best be generated
on the basis of an understanding of synonymity between multiculturalism
and feminism. It is worth emphasizing that my endorsement of the balanc-
ing approach here is centred on questions of orientation in regard to config-
uring multiculturalism and feminism, and only at the initial stage, to move
beyond the choice which seems to flow from the incompatibility thesis –
with regard to the more technical or practical aspects of this approach,
however, my comments have been largely critical.
The objection from multiculturalism II
With all this talk of policy in respect of systemic forms of minority patri-
archy, non-interference objectors might balk at the degree of intervention
which seems to follow from my proposals here; and no doubt their problems
would not end with these policies, but would also attach to those proposed
in respect of the more concrete or tangible practices of patriarchy included
in my working definition.18
Although, as many feminists have shown, non-interventionist argu-
ments are difficult to justify at the level of principled argument (e.g. Olsen,
1993), I continue to reflect these arguments in my own proposals, but more
at the practical level, for pragmatic reasons (see Kukathas, 1997b: 420,
discussing non-interventionism on these two levels). Many of the argu-
ments advanced to support this objection are compelling, particularly
when thinking about the practical or technical questions with which this
commentary has not been directly concerned. Here, I can merely note that
the synonymity thesis incorporates many (although not all) the arguments
driving this non-interventionist objection (c.f. Reitman, 2005: 204–6), and
this should be apparent if one considers the nature of the arguments which
I have advanced here, particularly where my discussion was most contex-
tual. The forms of multicultural accommodation I defended in respect of
minority patriarchy at this more practical level are informed by the prin-
ciple of respect for jurisdictional-autonomy argued for by many non-inter-
ventionists (e.g. Moore, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995: Chapter 8 and 1999a). I
endorsed policies which were justified using minority legal arguments – in
the example used, minority arguments in favour of more equitable distrib-
utive arrangements surrounding divorce.
In formulating responses to claims for multiculturalism in respect of
minority patriarchy – for instance, in responding to contemporary calls of
greater accommodation in respect of practices regulated by sharia or
halacha, of which the divorce case study used here is an example – the state
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should structure its actions on an understanding of synonymity between
multiculturalism and feminism, such that policy emanating from this
process would be made on the basis of the feminist multicultural principles
articulated in the first part of this commentary, themselves learned from the
multicultural feminist standpoint staked in the feminist difference debate.
While this can be seen as choosing feminism, it is a feminism which is
synonymous with multiculturalism in the most worrying quarters (where
patriarchy is directly implicated) and can be made to be compatible with it
in others (where patriarchy is less directly implicated).
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Notes
1 The feminist difference debate centred mostly, especially at the time, on differ-
ence among women arising between rather than within nation states, the
discussion tending to focus on the international more than the multicultural
context, although both forms of difference are the target in much of the debate.
2 For an overview of this vast debate, see Freedman 2001: Chapter 5; and for
references to authoritative texts, see footnotes in Flax, 1995 (Okin’s primary
antagonist in that debate).
3 I cannot engage with those parameters in the space available here, it being
sufficient for present purposes simply to observe that Kukathas’s proposals do
not advance a convincing solution to minority patriarchy.
4 For instance, Kukathas endorses (1992: 133) the use of generally applicable
state law governing marriage formation by women suffering in respect of the
practice of forced marriage in British Asian communities.
5 My critique of Shachar here only addresses part of the detail, notably that which
is meant to serve the security-fostering branch of this calculus. One of the
principal mechanisms by which Shachar intends to create incentives for reform
– rights of exit – finds more detailed criticism in Reitman, 2005, which deems
them unreliable, the upshot being that feminist cultural reform cannot be taken
as the guaranteed outcome of Shachar’s proposed framework.
6 It should be noted, however, that Shachar does not make her argument with
anything like the same degree of emphasis on feminist arguments as does Okin
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(cf. Shachar, 2001: 188 index entry revealing feminism only to receive five
mentions explicitly in her book, three of which, in footnotes).
7 Cf. n. 11 below.
8 For instance, in the text accompanying n. 11 below, he fails to ask whether any
accommodation is required to attend to the problems to which talaq divorce
regulation gives rise.
9 For example, Henry, 1999, quotes an influential advocate as suggesting that the
‘last thing you are going to get . . . is justice’. Patel, 1991 and Yuval-Davis, 1992
also voice opposition, from a multicultural feminist perspective, to the
empowerment of minority institutions by way of multicultural policy, even
where accommodation is motivated by concern for women within those
communities.
10 In the Introduction, I argued that the multiculturalism/feminism debate would
be well served by taking on board arguments aired in the feminist difference
debate. It should be noted that while Shachar does consider the arguments of
some multicultural feminist theories, I argue here that their arguments do not
seem well instantiated or put into application in the concrete proposals she puts
forward.
11 But note that there are cases in which Kymlicka envisages as much if not more
accommodation than Shachar. Kymlicka draws a distinction between national
minorities and immigrant groups and argues for more extensive self-regulation
regimes for the former than the latter category of minority (a category which
includes the minorities in question in our divorce example).
12 I have noted elsewhere that another facet of Shachar’s calculus (exit) can also
be expected to be counterproductive to the goal of fostering this sense of
security (Reitman, 2005).
13 Israel is a surprising example here given my argument elsewhere that aspects
of Shachar’s model (particularly its reliance on exit) work best in reference to
Israel were there is no formal or basic right of exit in respect of divorce
(Reitman, 2005: 19, fn. 4).
14 See, for example, NY Dom Rel Law 236(B)(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney Supp
2003) (US); Brett v Brett [1969] 1 All ER 1007 (CA) (Eng); Re Steinmetz (1980)
6 Fam LR 554 (Austl); Gindi v Gindi NYLJ 31 (Sup Ct 2001) (US) (in which
various multicultural states have recognized power to take account of the abuse
of Jewish divorce law in establishing how property should be distributed
between spouses following state divorce, so as to give women additional levers
in bargaining for an equitable regulatory outcome in respect of their Jewish
divorce).
15 Cf. Reitman 2005: 205–6 (on the difficulties these mechanisms present when
implemented without adequate deliberation).
16 Had not the terms taken on such sinister connotations, one would be tempted
to describe it thus: under the balancing approach, women suffer collateral
damage (patriarchy as the ‘unavoidable cost’ of multiculturalism) but under the
synonymity approach, this wager is reversed, and the group acquires collateral
benefit (in policy directly targeting minority patriarchy, it would acquire the
benefit of any accommodations defended using the synonymity thesis).
17 The distinction between systemic and more tangible forms of patriarchy is not
without difficulty. It is offered as a tactical distinction which is useful in many,
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but no doubt not all, cases (and I take comfort here from the fact that the
measures of accommodation included in the counterbalancing factors listed by
Okin would be defended under the approach I propose, since they would fall
in the second category.)
18 Note that the line drawn between accommodative and tolerationist multi-
culturalism is most challenged in reference to non-interventionist arguments,
since they can be found in both camps (compare e.g. Kukathas, 1997a: 89 with
Kymlicka, 1995: 167).
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